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While home price booms have been known for centuries, the recent 
boom is unique in its pervasiveness. Dramatic home price booms 
since the late 1990s have been in evidence in Australia, Canada, 
China, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, among other countries.1 There ap-
pears to be no prior example of such dramatic booms occurring in so 
many places at the same time.
Within the United States, the current boom differs from prior 
booms in that it is much more of a national, rather than regional, 
event. In the current boom, successive rounds of regional home price 
booms have occurred that eventually became what can be called a 
national boom.
The boom showed its first beginnings in 1998 with real (inflation-
corrected) home price increases first exceeding 10% in a year on the 
West Coast, in the glamour cities San Diego, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco and Seattle. The incipient boom then attracted only moderate 
attention since it was confined to the West Coast, and the cumulative 
price gain was still not dramatic. But the boom quickly spread east, 
with 10% one-year real home price increases appearing in Denver and 
then Boston in 1999. These cities kept on appreciating at a high rate. 
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As years went by, new cities started seeing substantial real home 
price increases. Even though it was a recession year, Miami, Min-
neapolis, New York, and Washington, D.C., began to see 10% real 
price increases in 2001. Then there arrived the late entrants, who 
compensated for their delay with the intensity of their price boom. 
Las Vegas first saw a 10% annual real home price increase in 2003, 
and real home prices shot up 49% in 2004. Phoenix first saw a 10% 
real price increase in 2004, and then real home prices shot up 43% 
in 2005. And still, as of that date, most of the other cities were still 
going up at substantial rates. The result of this succession of booms, 
in so many places has been a massive increase in national home prices 
over a period of nearly a decade. The boom was tempered somewhat 
by the fact that some cities never experienced booms. In Atlanta, 
Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, and Detroit, there was no 
year since 1998 in which real home prices increased by 10% in a 
year, though even these cities showed some increases. 
Chart 1 shows, with the heavy line, the S&P/Case-Shiller National 
Home Price Index for the United States, corrected for inflation us-
ing the consumer price index. This shows the market situation at the 
national level. Nationally, real home prices rose 86% between the 
bottom in the fourth quarter of 1996 and the peak 9.25 years later in 
the first quarter of 2006.
This dramatic price increase is hard to explain, since economic fun-
damentals do not match up with the price increases. Also shown on 
the figure is an index of real owner-occupied rent (thin line). Real 
rent has been extremely stable when compared with price. Real rent 
increased only 4% from the 1996-IV to 2006-I. The rent figures 
indicate that there has been virtually no change in the market for 
housing services, only in the capitalization of the value of these ser-
vices into price.
The boom in real home prices since 1996-IV cannot be explained 
by rising real construction costs either, even though there appears to 
be a common idea, among the general public, that it might. Using 
data from Engineering News Record (2007) and correcting it for in-
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gypsum wallboard rose 41% from the trough in real home prices in 
1996-IV to the peak in real home prices in 2006-I, the real price of 
5/8-inch plywood rose only 9%, and the real price of 2x4 common 
lumber actually fell 32%. Labor costs are the single most important 
component of building costs, and these showed little change as com-
mon-labor earnings have stagnated. The Engineering News Record 
Building Cost Index corrected for inflation showed relatively little 
change over this interval. In fact, the index corrected for CPI infla-
tion showed a slight decline from 1996-IV to 2006-I, as can be seen 
in Chart 1, dotted line. 
Note that real owners’ equivalent rent and real building costs track 
each other fairly well, as one might expect. But neither of them tracks 
real home prices at all, suggesting that some other factor—I will ar-
gue  market  psychology—plays  an  important  role  in  determining 
home prices.
Chart 1
Real U.S. Home Prices, Real Owners Equivalent Rent, and Real 
Building Costs, Quarterly 1987-I to 2007-II.
Source: Author’s calculations. Real U.S. Home Price is the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index de-
flated by the consumer price index (CPI-U) for the first month of the quarter rescaled to 1987-I=100. Real Owners 
Equivalent Rent is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Owners Equivalent Rent December 1982=100 from the CPI-U 
divided by the CPI-U, all items, 1982-4=100, both for the first month of the quarter, rescaled to 1987-I=100. Real 
building cost is the McGraw-Hill Construction/Engineering News Record Building Cost Index for the first month 
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The boom may be coming to an end in the United States where 
a sharp turnaround in home prices can be seen in the bold line in 
Chart 1, with real home prices falling 3.4% since the peak in the first 
quarter of 2006. Anecdotal reports are also appearing within the last 
year of a softening of the boom or even outright falls in home prices 
in other countries as well, but the data already in do not yet show 
this, and, on the contrary, some countries still seem to be appreciat-
ing fast. The latest S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (for May 
2007) even show a slight strengthening of the housing market in a 
number of cities.
When there are declines, they may be muted at first and disguised 
by noise. Home sellers tend to hold out for high prices when prices 
are falling.2 The 17% decline in the volume of U.S. existing home 
sales since the peak in volume of sales in 2005 is evidence that this is 
happening now.
The market for homes is clearly not efficient and shows enormous 
momentum from year to year, as Karl Case and I first demonstrated 
in 1988. We attributed this inefficiency to the high transactions costs 
associated with this market, which make exploitation of the ineffi-
ciency prohibitively expensive. In May 2006 the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, in collaboration with the firm I co-founded, MacroMar-
kets LLC, created futures and options markets for U.S. single-family 
homes that are cash-settled using the S&P/Case-Shiller home price 
indices. Some day these markets may have the effect of making home 
prices more efficient, but these markets still are not big enough to af-
fect the cash market very much. Given the tendency for long trends in 
home prices, and given the downward momentum in price and high 
valuation relative to rent, the possibility of a substantial downtrend in 
home prices over many years into the future must be considered.
The implications of this boom and its possible reversal in coming 
years stand as a serious issue for economic policy makers. It may 
be hard to understand from past experience what to expect next, 
since the magnitude of the boom is unprecedented. The implications 
of the boom have produced difficult problems for rating agencies 
who must evaluate the impact of the boom on securities such as the   Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Homeownership  93
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that have burgeoned in the 
U.S. from virtually nothing at the beginning of the housing boom 
to approximately $375 billion issued in 2006. The trickiest problem 
these agencies face in assessing these securities, many of which are 
backed by subprime mortgages, is correlation risk (the risk that many 
of the real-estate-backed assets will default at the same time), a risk 
that is directly connected to the risk of a macro real estate bust that 
may or may not follow the unprecedented boom.
In this paper, I will consider, from a broad perspective, the possible 
causes of this boom, with particular attention to speculative thinking 
among investors. I will argue that a significant factor in this boom 
was a widespread perception that houses are a great investment and 
the boom psychology that helped spread such thinking. In arguing 
this, I will make some reliance on the emerging field of behavioral 
economics. This field has appeared in the last two decades as a reac-
tion against the strong prejudice in the academic profession against 
those who interpret price behavior as having a psychological compo-
nent. The profession had come to regard all markets as efficient and 
to reject those who say otherwise. Now, however, behavioral eco-
nomics is increasingly recognized and has developed a substantial 
accumulation of literature that we can use to give new concreteness 
to ideas about psychology in economics.
Feedback and Speculative Bubbles
The venerable notion of a speculative bubble can be described as a 
feedback mechanism operating through public observations of price 
increases and public expectations of future price increases. The feed-
back can also be described as a social epidemic, where certain public 
conceptions and ideas lead to emotional speculative interest in the 
markets and, therefore, to price increases; these, then, serve to re-
produce those public conceptions and ideas in more people. This 
process repeats again and again, driving prices higher and higher, for 
a while. But the feedback cannot go on forever, and when prices stop 
increasing, the public interest in the investment may drop sharply: 
the bubble bursts.94  Robert J. Shiller
This basic notion of the underpinnings of speculative bubbles can 
be traced back hundreds of years in the writings of commentators 
on speculative markets. The germ of the idea seems to go back to 
the time of the tulip mania in Holland in the 1630s (Shiller 2003). 
But academic economists have long been cool to the idea that such 
feedback drives speculative prices, and it has remained, until recently, 
largely in the province of popular journalists. Academic economists 
who wrote about them (Galbraith 1954, Kindleberger 1978) found 
that the academic profession, while in some dimensions interested 
in their work, largely distanced itself from their views. Part of the 
academic resistance has to do with unfortunate divisions in the pro-
fession: The notion of a speculative bubble is inherently sociological 
or social-psychological and does not lend itself to study with the es-
sential tool bag of economists.
In my book Irrational Exuberance (2000, 2005), named after a fa-
mous remark of Alan Greenspan, I developed this popular notion of 
bubbles. I argued that various principles of psychology and sociol-
ogy, whose importance to economics has only recently become vis-
ible to most economists through the developing literature on behav-
ioral economics, help us to lend more concreteness to the feedback 
mechanism that creates speculative bubbles. These principles of psy-
chology include psychological framing, representativeness heuristic, 
social learning, collective consciousness, attention anomalies, gam-
bling anomalies such as myopic loss aversion, emotional contagion, 
and sensation seeking. 
I argued that the feedback that creates bubbles has the primary ef-
fect of amplifying stories that justify the bubble; I called them “new 
era stories.” The stories have to have a certain vividness to them if 
they are to be contagious and to get people excited about making 
risky investments. Contagion tends to work through word of mouth 
and through the news media. It may take a direct price-to-price form, 
as price increases generate further price increases. 
News commentators on speculative phenomena clearly have the idea 
that contagion may be at work but tend to stay away from a really so-
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economists refer to such feedback often, so they are not confident of 
such a view. They tend to revert back to the comfortable notion that 
markets are efficient or that everything that happens in speculative 
markets ultimately comes from actions of the monetary authority. 
The social epidemic model, with its psychological and sociological 
underpinnings, is too poorly understood by economists in general to 
be represented as an authoritative view in media accounts. 
I argued that a new era story that has been particularly amplified by 
the current housing boom is that the world is entering into a new era 
of capitalism, which is producing phenomenal economic growth, and 
at the same time producing both extreme winners and unfortunate 
losers. The phenomenal growth seen recently in China and India is 
part of the story, and the growing abundance of rich celebrities and 
extravagantly paid CEOs is another. The new era story warns people 
that they have to join the capitalist world and buy their homestead 
now, before it is priced out of reach by hordes of wealthy new inves-
tors. I also listed a number of other driving factors, partially or totally 
independent of this story, that also helped drive the housing boom.
That the recent speculative boom has generated high expectations 
for future home price increases is indisputable. Karl Case and I first 
discovered the role of high expectations in producing the California 
home price boom in the late 1980s. We did a questionnaire survey in 
1988 of homebuyers in the boom city Los Angeles (as well as Boston 
and San Francisco) and compared the results with a control city, Mil-
waukee, where there had been no home price boom then. 
The homebuyers were asked: “How much of a change do you expect 
there to be in the value of your home over the next 12 months?” For 
Los Angeles in 1988, the mean expected increase was 15.3%, and the 
median expected increase was 11%. The mean was higher than the 
median in Los Angeles since about a third of the respondents there re-
ported extravagant expectations, creating a long right tail in the distri-
bution of answers. For Milwaukee in 1988 the mean expected increase 
was only 6.1%, and the median was only 5%. From this and other 
results from the survey we concluded that the 1980s boom in Los An-
geles relative to Milwaukee appears to be driven by expectations.96  Robert J. Shiller
Case and I are now, beginning in 2003, repeating the same survey 
annually in the same cities. In 2003, with the same question as above, 
the reported expectations in Los Angeles were almost as heady as they 
were in 1988: The mean expected increase was 9.4%, the median 
10%. This time, however, the expectations of a good fraction of the 
people in Milwaukee had converged upwards towards those of Los 
Angeles: The mean expected increase was 8.6%. The median expected 
increase remained still low at 5%. Given that the Milwaukee housing 
market had not boomed substantially as of 2003, one wonders why 
the expectations of a good fraction of its inhabitants matched those 
of people in Los Angeles. Expectations of home price increase are 
probably formed from national, rather than local evidence for many 
people, especially at a time of national media captivation with the 
real estate boom. 
By 2006, as the housing market in Los Angeles was still going up 
but showed definite signs of weakening, the answers for the same 
question produced a mean expected price increase of only 6.1% and 
a median expected price increase of only 5%. In Milwaukee, the 
mean expected increase also cooled somewhat, to 6.8%, while the 
mean remained at 5%.
By 2007, after the housing market in Los Angeles dropped 3.3% 
(between May 2006 and May 2007, according to the S&P/Case-
Shiller Home Price Index), the answers for the same question (pre-
liminary results) produced a mean expected one-year price increase 
of -0.7% and a median expected one-year price increase of 0%. In 
Milwaukee, the answers showed a mean expectation of 6.5% and a 
median of 3%.3
Thus, our expectations data show remarkable confirmation of an 
essential element of the bubble story: Times and places with high 
home price increases show high expectations of future home price 
increases, and when the rate of price increases changes, so too do 
expectations of future price increases, in the same direction.
Many people seem to be accepting that the recent home price ex-
perience is at least in part the result of a social epidemic of optimism 
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the housing boom might be such a story and not something more 
tangible like the policies of the central bank has never really taken 
hold in public consciousness. People love to exchange stories of crazy 
investors or property flippers, but most just cannot seem to integrate 
such stories into a view of the movements of economies and mar-
kets. They do not accept that the market outcomes are the result of 
a world view, a Zeitgeist, that is encouraged by stories and theories 
whose contagion as ideas is amplified by the excitement surrounding 
the price increases.
We should still be careful not to overemphasize bubble stories in 
interpreting market movements. There are other factors that drive 
prices. Of course, monetary policy, which has the potential to affect 
the level of interest rates and hence the discount rate, is an important 
factor. But, even beyond monetary policy, it must be appreciated that 
there are many factors that drive decisions to purchase long-term assets 
such as housing. The decision to buy a house is a major life decision 
for most people and is affected by all the factors that people consider 
when deciding on their lifestyle and purpose. The decision is postpon-
able, and so anything that attracts attention to or away from housing 
can have a significant effect on the state of new construction.
Housing seems not to have been a very speculative asset until the last 
few decades, except in a few places where there is a story that encour-
ages people to think that housing may be especially scarce. The con-
ventional view among economists until recently has been that hous-
ing prices are driven primarily by construction costs. For example, this 
view was neatly laid out in 1956 by Grebler, Blank and Winnick.
It is not surprising that people did not view housing as a specula-
tive asset: Almost all of the value of houses has been value of struc-
ture, which is a manufactured good. From this view, there would be 
no reason to think that one can make money by buying houses and 
holding them for resale than that one can make money by buying ta-
bles and chairs and holding them for resale. People apparently knew 
that home prices were dominated by structure prices. The recent real 
estate boom has changed this. According to a recent study by Davis 
and Heathcote, the percent of home value accounted for by land in 
the United States rose from 15% in 1930 to 47% in 2006. 98  Robert J. Shiller
Whether this higher fraction of value attributed to land is a stable 
new equilibrium or is a temporary phenomenon induced by a specu-
lative bubble remains to be seen. Today, agricultural land sells for less 
than $2,000 an acre, or about $300 per lot-sized parcel, a miniscule 
number compared to the cost of a structure. Of course, this is usu-
ally land in the wrong place, far from the urban areas and jobs and 
schools that people want to get on with their lives. But there is reason 
to expect that as existing urban land becomes very expensive relative 
to structures, there will be efforts to substitute away from that land, 
and so the fraction of value attributed to land in housing may be 
expected to mean-revert. Such substitution takes time. 
New urban areas can be built elsewhere on land that is now cheap. 
Cities can economize on land by raising the population density and 
building high-rises. Already there is a movement advocating cities 
which, like Manhattan, or various urban areas in Europe and Asia, 
emphasize public transport and tall buildings bringing large numbers 
of people together. Such cities are highly attractive to many people 
because of the diversity of opportunity and entertainment there and 
also simply because of the feeling of excitement of crowds. Such cit-
ies make very economical use of land. Many more such cities can be 
built in the future, though, especially in the U.S., such new cities run 
against conventional notions of suburbia and automobile-based life. 
Christopher Leinberger (2007) has shown that there is an increas-
ing demand for “walkable urban centers” and finds that prices of liv-
ing space in such centers goes at a premium. This premium reflects 
tastes for a city with lots of attractions nearby within walking dis-
tance. This taste is not being rapidly fulfilled because of coordination 
problems and zoning restrictions. But, some developers have been 
able to crack this nut. He gives as an example Reston Town Center, 
built on then-cheap land in the country that surrounds Washington, 
D.C. It was planned starting in 1961 by developer Robert E. Simon, 
whose initials form the first part of the town name. He launched a 
campaign to get the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors to pass 
an ordinance allowing high-density housing there. The Town Center 
was dedicated in 1990. It is now a cluster of high-rises that mimics 
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large city centers. This and other examples prove that the quality of 
life in downtown glamour cities is reproducible, if only zoning does 
not stand in the way.4 It is plausible, then, that the economic pressure 
for more such spaces will eventually give way into the further devel-
opment of such projects. The supply of houses will increase without 
substantial land shortage problem. 
Concern about pollution, the environment, and energy costs may 
also provide an impetus to move towards such cities. But the expecta-
tion that such new urban areas will be built is not a certainty yet and 
will unfold, if it does, over many years.
Concern about economic inequality, which has been growing for 
decades now in most countries of the world, also has the potential to 
reduce barriers to the increase in the supply of housing and to bring 
prices down. For example, one of the first actions Gordon Brown 
took upon becoming Prime Minister was to offer a number of pro-
posals to encourage the construction of millions of new homes to 
relieve people priced out of the housing market. 
Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai have gotten great attention for a paper 
arguing that it may be reasonable to suppose that great cities will 
indefinitely outperform the economy in general. They found that 
some “superstar cities” have shown long-term, that is 50-year, ap-
preciation above national averages. But, their study found only rela-
tively small excess returns to homes in those cities. They use Census 
decadal owners’ evaluations of the value of their homes. They report 
much smaller differences across cities than people expect. Their pa-
per found that Los Angeles grew at 2.46% a year real 1950-2000, 
but this is far below the kind of expectations we have seen recently. 
According to our surveys, homebuyers in Los Angeles had a mean 
expectation for 10-year nominal price growth of 9.4% and a median 
of 10% in 2003. Moreover, in the decadal Census data there is no 
correction for quality change, and yet homes have been getting larger 
in the superstar cities, so the actual appreciation of existing homes 
was likely even less than 2.46% a year.
Considering the really long term, the centuries over which these 
cities persist, it is hardly reasonable to expect much more than a 1% 100  Robert J. Shiller
a year advantage in those cities in the long term, for that would mean 
doubling every 69 years relative to other cities. If New York City were 
on the same price level as other cities at the time of the American 
Revolution, at a 2% per year relative advantage in appreciation, a 
home there would now cost 100 times as much as the same home in 
other cities—hardly plausible. 
The Coldwell-Banker Home Price Comparison Index compares the 
price of a standard home across cities. They price “a single-family dwell-
ing model with approximately 2,200 square feet, 4 bedrooms, 21⁄2 baths, 
family room (or equivalent) and 2-car garage . . . typical for corporate 
middle-management transferees.” They report that Beverly Hills, Cali-
fornia, the home of movie stars, was the study’s most expensive market 
in 2006, with the price of the standard home there at $1.8 million. The 
average price of their standard home, averaging over all cities in 2006, 
was $423,950. Thus, the home in Beverly Hills is only 4 times more 
expensive than the average home. If we can assume that Beverly Hills 
emerged into maximum movie-star status over the space of 100 years, 
this amounts to only a little over 1% a year excess return. Thus, a 1% 
a year advantage is about the reasonable limit. For most investors 
in the recent boom environment, this is way under their expecta-
tions. Moreover, as Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai themselves pointed 
out, even the small advantage in appreciation that they claimed to 
find for the superstar cities has been offset by a lower rent-price ratio 
in those cities.
Homeownership and Consumption of Housing
Speculative booms in houses are unusual because purchasing a 
house is both an investment decision and a consumption decision. 
Moreover, the decision to purchase rather than rent is a decision not 
only to consume different kinds of housing services but also to lead 
a different kind of life; this difference has political ramifications, and 
so the purchase decision enters the arena of politics. 
In the United States, the home price boom since the late 1990s 
was accompanied by a substantial increase in the homeownership 
rate (the percent of dwelling units owned by their occupants, as re-
corded by the U.S. Census). As can be seen from Chart 2, in the U.S. Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Homeownership  101
there were actually two time periods in the last century over which 
the homeownership rate increased, from 1940 to 1960, and again 
during the recent home price boom, since the mid-1990s. Between 
these two periods, the homeownership rate was fairly constant. The 
first period of increase, between 1940 and 1960, showed the more 
dramatic increase; this increase was substantially the result of new 
government policies to encourage homeownership after the surge of 
mortgage defaults during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The increase since 1994 in homeownership appears to be due in 
large part to the remarkable housing boom. The boom psychology 
encouraged potential homeowners and encouraged lenders as well. 
Homebuyers were encouraged by the potential investment returns. 
Mortgage  lenders  were  encouraged,  since  the  boom  reduces  the 
default rate on lower-quality mortgages. The subprime mortgage 
market was virtually nonexistent before the mid-1990s and rose to 
account for a fifth of all new mortgages by 2005. Denial rates for 
mortgage applications plunged after around 2000. The new loans 
went disproportionately to lower-income borrowers and to racial and 
ethnic minorities.5 
Chart 2



























Source: The homeownership rate, percentage of homes that are occupied by their owner (decadal 1900 to 1960, 
annual 1965 to 2007) is from the U.S. Census. Housing/Consumption  (annual 1929 to 1946, quarterly 1947-I 
to 2007-I) is calculated by the author as the ratio of housing expenditures to personal consumption expenditures, 
National Income and Product Accounts, Table 2.3.5. 102  Robert J. Shiller
The change appears to be the result of changes in public expecta-
tions for the real estate market, rather than changes in government 
policy. Unlike the 1940s-60s boom in homeownership, the current 
boom  is  not  largely  due  to  government  initiatives  to  increase  the   
homeownership rate. Instead, there has been a uniform background of 
government approval for homeownership over a long time period. 
There has long been a popular view that homeownership is a thing 
to be encouraged, and as a result, philanthropists and government 
officials have tried to do so. 
The U.S. Civil War, 1860-65, was blamed by contemporaries on a 
low level of homeownership in the South:  “Ownership of real estate 
by its citizens is the real safeguard for the government. Where such 
a condition is almost universal, as in the Northern States, a revolu-
tion to destroy the government which guarantees that title is next to 
an impossibility. Had the system prevailed in the South, the people 
would not have been dragooned into rebellion . . .”6
The cooperative bank movement of the 19th and 20th centuries 
was motivated by a similar view. This movement was lauded in 1889 
for its effects on poor people: “It has taken them out of the tenement 
houses and freed them from the baneful influences which are apt to 
exhale therefrom.”7
There is some empirical support for the view. DiPasquale, Forslid, 
and Glaeser (2000) have found that homeowners tend to be more 
involved in local government, are more informed about their politi-
cal leaders, and join more organizations than renters do, even after 
controlling for other factors. The evidence for this view has led to 
widespread political support for policies that encourage homeowner-
ship over much of the world. 
On the other hand, contrary to expectations suggested by much of 
the literature on homeownership, homeownership rates across coun-
tries are not well explained in terms of any economic or demograph-
ic variables. Fisher and Jaffe (2002) could explain only 50% of the 
cross-country variability of homeownership rates. They found that in 
cross-country studies the homeownership rate is negatively correlated 
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There is, however, likely to be a limit on how far public policy should 
attempt to encourage homeownership. There are many sensible reasons 
for people to rent rather than own: People who cannot currently bear 
the responsibilities of household management, who are likely to move 
soon or who have other plans for their time, should rent rather than 
own. Renting rather than owning encourages a better diversification 
of investments; many homeowners have very undiversified investment 
portfolios, and these investments are often highly leveraged. Moreover, 
creating too much attention to housing as investments may encourage 
speculative thinking, and therefore, excessive volatility in the market 
for homes. Encouraging people into risky investments in housing may 
have bad outcomes. It is possible that some countries have overreached 
themselves in encouraging homeownership (UN-Habitat 2002).
One might suppose that the increase in homeownership is associ-
ated with an increased share of consumption allocated to housing. 
However, as can also be seen from the chart, which shows housing 
as a percentage of personal consumption expenditures from 1929 
to 2007, the share of consumption expenditures allocated to hous-
ing has stayed fairly constant at about 15% over the time interval, 
except for a temporary dip during World War II.8 Housing expen-
ditures include both the rent of tenant-occupied housing and the 
imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing. The U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis computes the latter based on rents of similar 
tenant-occupied housing.9 Thus, their calculations indicate that the 
amount of housing consumed has not increased as a fraction of total 
consumption; the increase in the homeownership rate reflects merely 
the switch from renting to owning of comparable-valued properties. 
Their numbers are not affected by the home price boom since the 
numbers are based on rents, not prices, of homes.
Residential Investment
Residential investment is a volatile component of GDP in the U.S., 
and it has had a highly significant relation to the business cycle. Resi-
dential investment represents essentially all economic activity direct-
ly related to housing structures. It is comprised of three main com-
ponents: construction of new single family homes, construction of 104  Robert J. Shiller
new housing units in multifamily structures, and “other structures,” 
which includes improvements as well as brokerage commissions.  
Chart 3, which was inspired by the work of Edward Leamer, as 
presented in his paper at the 2007 Jackson Hole conference, shows 
residential investment as a percent of GDP (quarterly 1947-I to 
2007-II). We see that residential investment has gone through cycles 
that correspond closely to the 10 recessions since 1950, as marked on 
the figure by business cycle dates computed by the NBER. Notably, 
residential investment as a percent of GDP has had a prominent peak 
before almost every recession since 1950, with a lead varying from 
months to years. There are only a couple of examples of such peaks 
that are not accompanied by recessions. Most striking from the fig-
ure is that ends of recessions were always marked by sharp upturns 
in residential investment within months of the end of the recession. 
The latest recession (2001) shows the least drop in residential invest-
ment as compared with all prior recessions shown, suggesting that 
the relation between housing investment and the business cycle may 
be changing.
Chart 3 also shows the real federal funds rate (end of month, 
monthly) computed by subtracting the rate of increase of the CPI-U 
for the latest 12 months. Note that the relation of the real funds rate 
to recessions is rather more ambiguous than the relation of residen-
tial investment to recessions. 
The  extraordinary  behavior  of  residential  investment  in  recent 
years, especially since 2000, stands out. Residential investment rose 
to 6.3% of GDP in the last quarter of 2005, the highest level since 
1950. We will consider the year 1950 as a case study below. But, 
we can note at first here that the 1950 economy was of course very 
unusual, for it followed World War II, a period when residential con-
struction had been sharply curtailed for the war effort. After the war, 
there was a phenomenal baby boom, which translated into a sharply 
increased demand for housing after the war had decreased the sup-
ply. No fundamental shock approaching the magnitude of the World 
War II shock appears to have been at work in the post-2000 residen-
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The right-most part of the figure can be used to illustrate a popular 
story for the latest home price boom, a story that it was all caused 
by the Fed. The real funds rate was cut sharply after 2000, and the 
housing boom (as measured by investment) took off. Then, in 2003, 
the Fed started raising real interest rates, and, following that, with a 
lag of a couple years, residential investment fell sharply. This story, 
which one repeatedly hears casually suggested, puts the full blame for 
the housing boom and bust on the Fed. The accuracy of this story in 
corresponding to the data since 2000 can be visualized in the chart 
by noting the almost mirror-opposite of the two series since 2000. 
But, the story is clearly an oversimplification at best as a model, be-
cause the same relation between residential investment and the funds 
rate had never been seen before in the entire period since 1950. In 
fact, before 2000, one sees rather more a positive, not negative rela-
tion between the real funds rate and residential investment as a per-
cent of GDP. From the figure, it appears that just as good a story for 
Chart 3
Residential Investment as Percent of GDP 
(quarterly, 1947-I to 2007-II) and  
Real Federal Funds Rate (monthly, January 1947 to July 2007).
Source: Author’s calculations. Residential investment and GDP are nominal values from National Income and Product 
Accounts. Real federal funds rate, end of month, is computed by subtracting the rate of increase of CPI-U for the 
12 months up to and including the month. Recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research are 
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a number of recessions would be that the Fed cut rates in response 
to weakening housing investment prior to the recession than that it 
caused the declines in housing investment by raising rates.10
Broad Historical Comparisons
There have been many real estate booms in history and real estate 
cycles that may be variously described as speculative booms or mere 
construction booms without any speculative enthusiasm.
Chart 4 shows the unusualness of the boom in a broad historical 
perspective using three series of home prices, series for the Nether-
lands, Norway, and the United States, countries for which long his-
torical price indices are available that make some attempt to control 
for changing size and quality of homes. The Dutch series was created 
by Piet Eichholtz at Maastricht University and applies to Amsterdam 
only. The Norwegian series, created by Øyvind Eitrheim and Solveig 
Erlandsen, covers Bergen, Oslo, and Kristiansand, and from 1897, 
Trondheim, through 2003. The series was updated to 2006 and de-
flated by Harald Magnus Andreassen of First Securities in Norway. In 
all three countries the same general observations emerge: There has 
been an enormous home price boom since the 1990s, which dwarfs 
anything seen before.
Case Studies of Booms
Let us pursue here three case studies that illustrate the dynamics 
of real estate booms, with special attention to the psychology of the 
activity. We will consider here the 1950 home construction boom, 
which stands out in Chart 4, the 1970s U.S. farmland boom, and the 
sudden reversal in the market for homes in the United Kingdom in 
2005, when a speculative market that was generally recognized as fin-
ished and in decline suddenly reversed and began booming again. 
The 1950 U.S. Construction Boom
The only time when construction activity in the U.S. was higher 
as a percent of GDP than it was in 2005 was the year 1950, when Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Homeownership  107
residential investment rose to 7.3% of GDP. Construction activity 
was described at the time as at record levels in all major regions of 
the United States. Why? It is not enough to dismiss this as a boom to 
correct shortages induced by World War II, since 1950 was already 
five years after the end of the war. In 1947, two years after the war, 
construction as a percent of GDP was as low as 4.3%, well below 
the postwar average of 4.8%. Moreover, in the following year, 1951, 
residential investment as a percent of GDP fell to 5.0%, just a little 
above the historical average.
Throughout this time, around 1950, there was no boom in real 
home prices, as can be seen from Chart 4. Home prices were rather 
flat, after having increased a lot at the very end of World War II. It 
appears also that there were not expectations, at least at the beginning 
Chart 4
Home price indices deflated for consumer prices and rescaled 
to 1890=100, Netherlands, Norway, and USA. 
The Netherlands index (semi-annual 1890-1973 then annual 1974-2004) is produced by Piet Eichholtz of Maastricht 
University; it is for the Herengracht region of Amsterdam 1900-1973, which he updated to 2004 using other data 
for the city of Amsterdam. The Norway index (annual) is a Norges Bank series (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, http://
www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article____42332.aspx) 1890-2003 updated to 2006 and deflated by Harold Magnus 
Andreassen of First Securities ASA, Oslo. The USA index (annual 1890-2007) is from Robert Shiller, Irrational Exu-
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of the year, for further home price increases. A Washington Post opin-
ion survey of builders, realtors and bankers in the greater Washing-
ton, D.C., area published January 22, 1950, found 126 persons who 
thought that prices would remain the same in 1950, 46 who expected 
a price rise, and 38 who expected a price decline. Expectations of in-
crease were about matched by expectations of decrease, and, in fact, 
given inflation, people effectively were expecting a fall in real prices. 
This was no speculative bubble. So, why were home sales setting all-
time records?11
The press in 1950 offered a number of reasons for the boom. First, 
there were the concrete reasons. The Housing Act of 1950 reduced in-
terest rates on FHA-insured loans by 0.25% and raised the guarantee 
of VA loans from 50% to 70%. “Increased competition” from these 
government-subsidized loans was said to have led private lenders to 
improve their terms: offering 30-year mortgages where once they had 
offered only 20-year and offering no-down-payment loans, controver-
sial new products that were seen as necessary to stay competitive.12  
This stimulus to housing demand appeared to come from Con-
gress and mortgage lenders, not monetary policy. Fed policy at the 
beginning of 1950 was described as “neutral” with fears of rekindling 
inflation offset by evidence of weakness in the business situation and 
slumping commodity prices.13 
But beyond these concrete factors, the newspaper accounts refer to 
other psychological factors that are suggestive of the kind of things 
that affect general public thinking and are hard for most of us to re-
member later. First of all, even though expectations of price increases 
did not seem to be a factor, there was repeated mention of people 
giving up waiting for price declines in housing (after the immediate 
postwar inflation) and a spreading feeling that “used house prices are 
not going down much more.”14  
The flight to suburbia was underway, and this flight was associated 
with a new American lifestyle and a new sense of community: “No-
body worries about keeping up with the Joneses and everybody be-
comes a good neighbor.”15 To the extent that the 1950 construction 
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urban living away from center city living, there would be no reason to 
expect the surge in demand to boost existing home prices over all.
The beginnings of the war in Korea, with North Korea’s surprise 
invasion of South Korea on June 25 and the first clash between 
North Korea and the U.S. on July 5, led many to war fears, even 
fears of a “third world war.” The possibility seemed very real that 
government restrictions on prices and construction might be in place 
again. Indeed, President Truman warned of possible rationing and 
price ceilings in July and asked for limited powers to control produc-
tion and credit. Congressional debate began to consider price ceilings 
on real estate transactions. By December, with CPI inflation rapidly 
building, price and production controls were seen as “inevitable,” 
and the beginnings of price controls were put in place.16 It is hard to 
know exactly what people expected, but we do know that in 1950, 
according to a number of contemporary observers, buyers were “now 
resigned to the fact that if they are ever going to have a home, they 
hadn’t better wait any longer.”17 
The new war against Communists, coupled with the 1949 Soviet 
atomic bomb and the possible involvement of the Soviet Union in the 
war, led to an atomic bomb scare. Columnist Drew Pearson wrote: 
However,  in  this  year  1950,  half  way  through  this   
modern  and  amazing  century,  we  are  in  real  danger  of   
bogging  down  in  an  “age  of  fear.”  Faced  with  the  awful 
knowledge that others have the atomic bomb, faced with 
fear of the hydrogen bomb, of bacteriological warfare, of new 
trans-oceanic submarines and transatlantic rockets, we are in 
definite danger of relapsing into an age of fear, an age when 
we do not go forward because we are paralyzed with fright.18 
The fear led to concerted plans for civil defense, the construction 
of bomb shelters, and much talk about where the bombs might hit. 
It also led to a boom of new construction in the suburbs and coun-
tryside, which allowed people to escape the risk of a possible nuclear 
attack on the center city, a powerful force that reshaped the country 
away from center cities.19 One contemporary observer wrote of the 
suburban developers: “They’re cashing in on the steady trek of city 110  Robert J. Shiller
families to the suburbs, a trend that may be getting a little extra push 
from the war scare and atom bomb developments.”20
It is difficult to capture all the thinking that goes into people’s de-
cision to buy a home this year rather than another year. One gets 
a sense that those who were writing in 1950 were having as much   
difficulty in understanding mass thinking about real estate as we have 
today. One realtor who was interviewed in 1950 said simply, “I also 
believe there is a psychological factor in home buying which is now 
expressing itself in a mass desire to buy homes.”21  
This psychological factor in 1950 may bear some resemblance to 
the psychological factors at work in the early 2000s, even though in 
1950 there was no classic speculative boom, and there apparently was 
little enthusiasm for housing as “the best investment.” There are still 
similarities with 1950, in a sense that home prices are not going down, 
that one may have to buy now or miss out on an opportunity to buy at 
all, and a war and a general feeling of anxiety about personal safety. 
The 1970s Boom in U.S. Farmland Prices
Farmland prices went through an extraordinary boom in the 1970s. 
Chart 5 shows real U.S. farmland prices since 1900. Three big events 
stand out in this century-plus of data: a boom in the 1970s, a bust in 
the 1980s, and a renewed boom in the 2000s. 
The farmland boom of the 1970s was sometimes attributed at the 
time to rising food prices. In fact, the farm products component of the 
U.S. producer price index rose a total of 9% relative to the consumer 
price index from 1970 to 1980 and then leveled off. These move-
ments are not big enough to justify the farmland boom and bust. 
More important than the food prices may be the “great popu-
lation scare” of the 1970s. In 1972, a Club of Rome study Limits 
on Growth, authored by Donella H. Meadows and her colleagues 
at MIT, predicted that expanding population growth would soon 
lead to exhaustion of resources, and a prominent scenario in their 
analysis was mass starvation around the world. The book received ex-
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establishment as alarmist and without substantial evidence. The ef-
fects of this scare were felt all over the world. For example, China 
instituted her one-child policy in 1979. 
Changes in the behavior of institutions were part of the boom phe-
nomenon. Tax institutions changed in the direction of support for 
the boom. U.S. federal tax law was changed in 1976 to allow farm 
estates left to a member of the immediate family to be valued at a 
capitalization of rents, rather than the high market prices, for com-
putation of estate taxes, and to be paid over 15 years. Thus, it appears 
that the boom stimulated Congress to place farmland in a special 
privileged category for capital-gains tax purposes.
In the high-inflation years of the late 1970s, a theory began to take 
hold among institutional investors that farmland is a good inflation 
hedge. In 1980, the New York Times wrote:
Investment funds, traditionally leery of investment in farm-
land, are starting to flow more rapidly into agriculture. Several 
major insurance companies have stepped up their purchase of 
farmland in the past two years and a number of other insti-
Chart 5
Real farmland values, in U.S. 2006 dollars, per acre, decadal 
1900-1910, annual 1911-2006. 
Source: author’s calculations. The nominal USDA-NASS is divided by the CPI-U for the first month of the year and 
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tutions “are beginning to express greater interest in farmland,’’ 
according to Irving S. Wolfson, executive vice president of the 
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford.22
Meanwhile, investment funds specializing in farmland investments 
were set up, such as the American Agricultural Investment Manage-
ment Co. and Oppenheimer Industries.
Newspaper accounts of the time described the 1970s as due in part 
to speculative foreign investors:
Although much of the foreign money is hard to trace, 
European  Investment  Research  Center,  a  private  consult-
ing firm based in Brussels, estimates that foreigners invested 
some $800 million in farmland last year. That would come 
to a startling 30% of all foreign direct investment in the U.S., 
according to the Commerce Dept. “What we are witnessing,” 
says Kenneth R. Krause, a senior economist for the Agricul-
ture Dept., “is the biggest, continuing wave of investment 
in American farmland since the turn of the century.” . . . 
Amrex Inc., a San Francisco-based real estate firm, is hold-
ing a meeting in Zurich next week to introduce buyers to 
sellers who represent as much as $750 million worth of U.S. 
farmland. Some observers warn that the industry is attracting 
its share of hucksterism as well. West German newspapers 
are being flooded with real estate advertisements, apparently 
from small U.S. brokers, that often offer only an anonymous 
post office box number for an address.23
The boom period coincided with a common theme in newspapers 
of the time that there was concern that farmland was rapidly shrink-
ing as it was converted to homes, shopping centers, and parking lots, 
thereafter likely never to return to cultivation. It seemed like a brand 
new idea: Who had ever thought that a farm, once converted, would 
never again revert back to farmland?  Eventually, a 1980 federal study 
“National Agricultural Lands Study” sounded this alarm. In describ-
ing this study, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland noted then 
that the idea that farmland was being consumed was a new one: “This 
question never has been seriously addressed because, for as long as I 
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This boom even had a hit song associated with it, Joni Mitchell’s 
“Big Yellow Taxi,” which had the refrain:
They paved paradise
And put up a parking lot
With a pink hotel, a boutique
And a swinging hot spot.
Don’t it always seem to go
That you don’t know what you’ve got 
Till it’s gone
They paved paradise
And put up a parking lot.
Joni Mitchell’s song “Big Yellow Taxi” had an unusual appeal to 
thinking people and had a very long life. Issued in 1970, it reached a 
peak of #24 on the Billboard chart in 1975, just before the most rap-
id price increases of the farm price boom. (Curiously, the same song 
was recorded by the Counting Crows in 2003, near the peak of the 
recent farmland boom, and reached #42 on the Billboard chart.)
The end of the boom coincides with President Carter’s Soviet grain 
embargo, which lowered the price of grains that farms produced, as 
well as the sharp rise in interest rates during Volcker’s term, and the 
recessions of 1980 and 1981-2. 
After the correction following 1980, the 1970s explosion of farm 
prices was described as a dramatic bubble. One account, in 1983, 
wrote that values “overexpanded in the belief that inflationary run-
ups in land prices would never end.”25 It does appear that it was a 
bubble, and spurred by stories and lore that emphasized the emerg-
ing scarcity of farmland. It was perhaps a more rational one than the 
housing bubble we appear to be in recently, for at least farmland is 
not reproducible, as housing structures are.
The Turnaround in London Home Prices in 2005
Chart  6  shows  an  index  of  real  greater-London  existing  house 
prices, for a case study that concerns the downturn in real prices 
from the second quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2005. That 114  Robert J. Shiller
downturn is not the most striking feature of the figure. It is much 
more striking that real home prices more than doubled from 1983 
to 1988 and then fell 47%, coming almost all the way back down 
by 1996, producing an almost-perfect inverted-V pattern in home 
prices over a period of thirteen years. Also very striking is the boom 
in home prices from 1996 to the present, which shows real home 
prices nearly tripling. But here, we are focusing instead on the much 
smaller 6% downturn in real home prices over the year from 2004-II 
to 2005-II. This downturn was quickly reversed: Real home prices 
resumed heading up at a rate of 9% a year from 2005-II to 2007-I, 
not so much smaller than the 12% a year real price increase from 
1996 to 2004. 
This small downturn is interesting now because it looks very much 
like the downturn that we have seen in U.S. prices in the last year. If 
one places a piece of paper over the chart positioned so as to block out 
all data after the second quarter of 2005, one will see a price path that 
closely resembles that seen in Chart 1 for the U.S. above. The decline 
in London home prices was interpreted by many as the end of the 
home price boom, but the downdraft was suddenly and decisively re-
Chart 6
Greater London Real Home Price Index, Quarterly, 
1987-I to 2007-II 
Source: Author’s calculations. The Halifax Greater London existing house price index is divided by the U.K retail price 
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versed. It is very common to hear forecasts that the U.S. home market 
is near a bottom now and will resume its upward climb soon. These are 
forecasts for a repeat of the London experience after 2005. 
The Bank of England had begun tightening rates in November 
2003 when the base rate was 3.5% and completed the tightening 
in August 2004, when the base rate reached 4.75%. The decline in 
home prices began about six months before they stopped tighten-
ing. But it is hard to see why this modest tightening should have 
been responsible for the decline in home prices. Similar interest rate 
increases in 1997 and 1999 had not stopped the housing boom, and 
interest rates were still lower in 2005 than at the ends of these pri-
or tightening cycles. Despite the tightening, 2016 index-linked gilt 
yields fell over the same interval, from 1.93% to 1.79%, which, if 
anything, would suggest that home prices should rise, not fall. After 
home prices bottomed, index-linked gilt yields continued essentially 
the same downward trend until September 2006 and then began to 
rise. Thus, it is hard to see an explanation for the price behavior at 
this time in terms of interest rate changes.
The 2004-5 downturn in U.K. home prices was the subject of 
thousands of newspaper articles at the time. Some of these articles 
spoke of the “end of the housing boom” or “the last desperate gasp 
of a defunct housing boom” as if this end were self-evident. Even 
those who were relatively optimistic did not predict the strong recov-
ery that actually transpired. One reporter wrote that “even optimists 
forecast prices will rise by no more than 2 percent annually in the 
next few years—and pessimists expect an outright fall.”26  
An important theme in these articles was comparison with other 
countries. In an article in The Independent entitled “Property Market 
Cools in Britain, But in U.S. It’s the Latest Gold Rush,” it was noted 
that “Just as in Britain, dinner party conversations that used to be 
about schools or sports now have one constant topic: property prices, 
and the outrageous price the neighbours got for their house across the 
street.”27 Continuing housing booms in France, Ireland, Spain (where 
the boom was still strong), and the Netherlands (where a boom had 
converted into a soft landing of slower price increases) were also not-
ed. Since the Bank of England had raised rates while other central 116  Robert J. Shiller
banks had not, blame for the weakening housing market was often 
attributed to the temporary effects of these rate increases, rather than 
to any change in market psychology, thereby discouraging any sudden 
change in expectations about long-run home price increases.28
There is a sort of coordination problem with psychological expec-
tations in a time of a boom. If people infer their expectations from 
recent price changes not just at home but in other places, then it may 
be hard for sharply changed expectations ever to take root. People be-
lieve that a change in market psychology drives the housing market, 
and if they look both near and far to gauge the psychology of others, 
then it will be hard to see a change.
Moreover, the kind of expectation for home prices that is implicit in 
the common 21st century world view—that increasing home prices 
are the result of our capitalist institutions and the phenomenal eco-
nomic growth that the adoption and perfection of these institutions 
around the world has brought about—is not likely to be changed 
suddenly by the appearance of short-run price declines.
It is hard to find in any account in the news media any objective 
reason for the resurgence of the boom after the second quarter of 
2005. The Bank of England did not substantially cut the base rate: 
There was only a small 25 basis point cut in August of 2005, and in 
fact the rate was then increased by over a percentage point by May 
of 2007. The tiny and relatively brief rate cut could hardly be held 
responsible for the massive turnaround in the housing market.
The return of the boom came as a complete surprise. An October 
2005 article said: “Between January and April sales were about 25% 
below average. It’s quite staggering how things have turned around 
in the last couple of months. We are now back to average levels, and 
are seeing more transactions than at this time last year.” The best 
this article could come up with as an explanation was “house prices 
have not fallen as much as some analysts were warning. This has 
given buyers the confidence to re-enter the market as the fear of los-
ing money on a property purchase is eroding.”29 From a behavioral 
economics perspective, that explanation is not silly, as it is part of a 
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This London case study should caution any who feel that a sub-
stantial decline in home prices in the U.S. is inevitable, given the 
recent declines, but not really offer much comfort for real estate 
optimists either, given the isolation, and special character, of the 
brief London downturn.
Conclusion
The view developed here of the boom in home prices since the late 
1990s has it operating as a classic speculative bubble, driven largely by 
extravagant expectations for future price increases. As such, the situation 
may well result in substantial declines in real home prices eventually.
The case studies above suggest that there are a wide variety of con-
siderations and emotions that impact a decision whether or not to 
buy a house. If there are fears of war or terrorism (as we saw in the 
case of the 1950 boom) or fears of environmental destruction (as 
we saw in the case of the farmland boom of the 1970s), then there 
may be major changes in home prices or construction activity even if 
there is no change in the traditional list of fundamentals. 
Institutional changes tend to come in connection to the speculative 
psychology, not just as exogenous advances in financial or bureau-
cratic technology. Thus, we saw the lengthening of mortgage ma-
turities during the real estate boom of 1950, the development of real 
estate investing institutions, and changes in the tax law during the 
farmland boom of the 1970s. From these examples, it should be no 
surprise that we have seen the proliferation of new mortgage credit 
institutions, the deterioration of lending standards, the growth of 
subprime loans, and the rapid expansion of the CDO market in the 
real estate boom of the 2000s.
Monetary policy does not come out as central in the case studies 
examined here. Monetary policy is in an important sense concen-
trated on the extreme short-term. The fundamental target variable 
in the U.S. is the federal funds rate, an overnight rate. And yet, eco-
nomic decision makers are focused on a lifetime decision problem. 
Economic decision makers have to decide on the long-term, 50-year-
plus, value of their investments. The difference of maturities is a fac-118  Robert J. Shiller
tor on the order of 10,000 to one. Using monetary policy to manage 
such decisions is a little bit like adding a grain of sand a day to a scale 
that is weighing a car. 
People’s opinions about long-term decisions, notably how much 
housing to buy and what is a reasonable price to pay, change in the 
short-term only because their opinions about the long-term change. 
But, these opinions about the long-term are hard to quantify because 
they are usually not expressed. They are usually expressed only in 
story form, in attention given to homespun theories, and the like.
People base life decisions upon vague expectations for the future, 
and if they have the false impression that they have a unique property 
that is going to become extremely valuable in the future, then they 
may consume more, driving the economy, and they may drive up 
prices today. That is what we have seen happening over much of the 
last decade.
The psychological expectations coordination problem appears to 
be a major factor in explaining the extreme momentum of home 
price increases. Investors who think that home prices will continue 
to go up because they perceive prices as going up generally around 
the world may not change this expectation easily since they will have 
trouble coordinating on a time to make the change. A housing sup-
ply response to high prices will tend to bring prices down, but the 
increment to housing supply in any one year is necessarily tiny given 
the nature of construction technology, and that supply can be ab-
sorbed easily if expectations are still strengthening. If, however, price 
declines continue in the United States, there could be a more coordi-
nated response to enforce declining expectations around the world. If 
the United States shows substantial price declines, then the underly-
ing popular story of the boom, related to the perception of a triumph 
of capitalism and the explosive growth of the world’s economies, may 
become old. The United States, the premier example of a capitalist 
economy, has the potential to lead price expectations downward in 
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The example, considered above, of the recovery from decline in 
London in 2005 serves as a good reminder that speculative markets 
are inherently unpredictable, and that the incipient downturn in the 
United States could reverse and head back up. No one seems to have 
a good understanding of what causes these reversals. Still, the exam-
ples we have of past cycles indicate that major declines in real home 
prices—even 50% declines in some places—are entirely possible go-
ing forward from today or from the not-too-distant future. Such price 
declines have happened before. In the last cycle in the United States, 
as shown in Chart 1, real home prices fell only 15% from the peak in 
the third quarter of 1989 to the fourth quarter of 1996, but some cit-
ies’ real prices fell much more. Los Angeles real home prices fell 42% 
from the peak in December 1989 to the trough in March 1997. We 
saw from Chart 6 that real home prices in London fell 47% from the 
third quarter of 1988 to the fourth quarter of 1995. 
The boom cycle that followed these declines, after the late 1990s, 
was even bigger than that preceding them, and so it is not improb-
able that we will see such large real price declines extending over 
many years in major cities that have seen large increases. Since the 
number of cities involved in the recent boom is so much higher than 
in the last boom, we could see much more than the 15% real drop in 
real national home price indices that we saw last time. 
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